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gress intended Section 341 to preempt the available avenues of
attack upon the collapsible corporation, it is submitted that it
would have inserted statutory language to that effect, similar to
that inserted in Section 671 of the Clifford Trust provisions of
the 1954 Code.
Irwin E. Ginsberg
USE OF MANDAMUS TO REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTIONS IN NEW YORK
INTRODUCTION
The growth in number and in influence of administrative
bodies in the past few decades has resulted in an ever increasing
body of litigation in which those who believe themselves wronged
by governmental agencies seek redress in the courts. The extra-
ordinary remedy of mandamus has proved to be a convenient de-
vice for obtaining judicial review in many cases.
Although the common law writ of mandamus has been abol-
ished in New York the relief formerly obtainable under that
writ is available under the statutory substitute.' While the
statute has achieved the salutary effect of eliminating the danger
of an incorrect selection among the extraordinary remedies it has
been recognized by the courts that the relief available under Article
78 of the Civil Practice Act is coextensive with that which existed
before the reformed procedure.2  For this reason no distinction
will be made between cases of mandamus and the present cases
in the nature of mandamus. The procedural consolidation has
quite understandably resulted in a diminishing use of the old
label by the courts.3 For purposes of convenience, however, the
term "mandamus" will be used indiscriminately herein to charac-
terize actions of this nature both before and after the passage
of Article 78.
TmE MA TDATORY-DIsCRETIOxARY DISTINCTION
A consideration of the factors employed by the courts in
deciding whether mandamus should be granted in a particular
case must necessarily include a mention of the most common cri-
terion used in deciding cases umder the old writ. The old theory
was that mandamus could be had only to compel performance of
1. C. P.A. § 1283.
2. Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 33 N.E. 2d 75 (1941); see
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT N. Y. JUDII.AL COUNCIL 132 (1937).
3. See Fiore v. O'Connell, 297 N. Y. 260, 78 N.E. 2d 602 (1948); Ncw York
State Soc. of Prof. Eng. v. Education Dept, 262 App. Div. 602, 31 N.Y. S. 2d (3d
Dep't 1941).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ministerial duties and not actions described as judicial in nature4
or discretionary.5 The limiting effect of this traditional view was
reduced when it later came to be acknowledged that mandamus
would lie when an officer or agency had abused its discretion in
refusing to act.0 Section 1284 of the Civil Practice Act recogmizes
that mandamus has been available to "compel performance of a
duty specifically enjoined by law;" '7 and "to review a determina-
tion of an administrative body." '8
The distinction between duties found to be mandatory and
those found to be discretionary is not always clear and the courts
often do not specify into which classification a particular case
falls.9 One court has stated: "Ultimately the question as to whether
the words of a . . . statute are mandatory or discretionary is a
matter of legislative intention to be gathered in the light of all
the circumstances, having regard to the purposes sought to be
accomplished by the . . . legislation."'1 9  Clearly the fact that
the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute indicates that
an act is ministerial is not always controlling."-
The distinction is perhaps no longer of great importance in
view of the fact that the courts can act in both situations and
often do not distinguish between the types.' 2  Cases involving
clearly mandatory acts present no great difficulty. It is when an
exercise of administrative discretion is challenged in the courts
that problems arise.
AB5SOLuTE DIsCRETION
Although the old mandatory-discretionary distinction has been
virtually abandoned for practical purposes, there remains some
4. People ex rel. Francis v. Common Council of Troy, 78 N.Y. 33 (1879).
5. People ex rel. Schwab v. Grant, 126 N.Y. 473, 27 N.E. 964 (1891) ; People
ex rel. Harris v. Commissioner, 149 N.'Y. 26, 43 N. E. 418 (1896).
6. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 195, 33 N.E. 827 (1893) ; People
ex rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing Comm., 190 N.Y. 31, 82 N.E.
723 (1907).
7. C.P.A. §1284 (3).
8. C. P.A. §1284 (2).
9. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YoRK 351(1942).
10. Rudhlan Amusement Co. v. Geraghty, 146 Misc. 308, 315, 262 N.Y. Supp.
269, 278 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; see Rushford v. LaGuardia, 280 N.Y. 217, 20 N.E. 2d 547
(1939) ; Divisich v. Marshall, 257 App. Div. 294, 13 N.Y. S. 2d 935 (1st Dep't 1939).
11. See Dr. Bloom Dentist v. Cruise, 259 N.Y. 358, 182 N.E. 16, appeal dis-
missed 288 U. S. 588 (1932); Matter of Lindgren, 232 N.Y. 59, 133 N.E. 353 (1921).
12. Although the mandatory-discretionary distinction probably does not have much
effect in influencing the actual result in an individual case, the courts continue to use
it as a justification for their denial of mandamus in cases where other factors would
undoubtedly cause a denial of the remedy. E. g. Gimprich v. Board of Education, 306
N.Y. 401, 118 N.E. 2d 578 (1954). For an earlier discussion of the distinction see
Patterson, Ministerial and Discretionary Offcial Acts, 20 Micir. L. R v. 848 (1922).
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question as to whether a new distinction has not been drawn be-
tween reviewable and absolute discretion. Benjamin, in his com-
prehensive study of administrative law in New York asserts that
there are "some instances in which administrative discretion is
held to be absolute and unreviewable . . .
In Sheridan v. McElligott, 4 the court, faced with a New York
City ordinance stating that the Fire Commissioner "shall have
the power" to award a pension under specified circumstances,
held the language to be a grant of discretion not reviewable by
the court. However, words which seemingly impart unlimited
discretion are not always so construed by the courts. In another
case the court held the administrative action to be reviewable
where the authorizing statute provided: ". .. the Regents shall
have . . . power to indorse a license . . issued in any other
state or country. . .. ,'5
It would seem that many of the "instances" of absolute dis-
cretion spoken of by Benjamin are merely cases where the court
is implicitly finding that the exercise of discretion was proper,
while expressing the decision in terms of umreviewability. If the
action of the Commissioner in the Sheridan case, for example,
was of a type which the courts characterize as "arbitrary", "un-
fair" or "capricious" the exercise of discretion would probably
have been found to be reviewable. The Court of Appeals has
stated: "In the absence of clear expression by the Legislature to
the contrary, the courts may review the exercise of a discretionary
power vested in an administrative officer or body to determine
whether the case discloses circumstances which leave no possible
scope for the reasonable exercise of discretion in such manner."' 0
[Emphasis added.] In view of the decisions on this question it
may well be that the clear expression required for a preclusion of
judicial review must be a positive prohibition rather than a nega-
tive implication.
ABU1SE OF Disc.Tiox
The principle that mandamus lies to correct an abuse of dis-
cretion by an administrative body was recognized as long ago as
1893.17 An early statement of the principle was that: "If . . .
administrative action is arbitrary, tyrranical and unreasonable,
or is based on false information, the relator may have a remedy
13. BENJAMIN, OP. cit. supra note 9, p. 353.
14. 278 N.Y. 59, 15 N. E. 2d 398 (1938).
15. Levi v. Regents, 256 App. Div. 444, 10 N.Y. S. 2d 1013 (3d Dep't), aff'd
281 N.Y. 627, 22 N. E. 2d 178 (1939).
16. Schwab v. McElligott, 282 N.Y. 182, 186, 26 N.E. 2d 10, 12 (1938).
17. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N. Y. 195, 33 N. E. 827 (1893).
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through mandamus to right the wrong which he has suffered." 18
It appears from the early cases that actions which would not
ordinarily be thought of in terms of the quoted combination of
adjectives were found by the court to be subject to correction by
mandamus.' 9 The statement is, however, typical of the language
used by the courts at that time and which is used with minor
variation even in recent cases. 20  The cases in which an admin-
istrative act is found subject to correction by mandamus generally
fall into one of a few broad categories.
Unauthorized Regulation
When an administrator is given the power to regulate a
certain activity he is bound by the restrictions imposed by the
legislature in granting the authority. Frequently the authorizing
statute will be silent as to whether the administrative body may
act in a certain manner. This does not mean that the administrator
is completely free to promulgate such regulations as he sees fit.
A common example of this type of authority is found in licensing
statutes where specific directives to the licensing officer are absent.
Judicial intervention in such cases has not been confined to in-
stances of flagrant discrimination by the administrator, but has
been held appropriate when the official uses a standard of conduct
not prescribed by the legislature. Thus where the State Racing
Commission had statutory power to grant or refuse licenses to
hold races, and had based the refusal of a license to one applicant
on the ground that the entire racing season had been divided'
among other tracks, the court held that the refusal was arbitrary
since the statute did not provide for such exclusive allotment.2
It has been held further that even where a limitation on the
number of licenses issued by an officer may be in the public in-
terest, the administrator is not justified in refusing licenses to
qualified applicants in the enforcement of the limitation unless
the limitation is imposed by the legislature.
Similar to these is the type of case exemplified by People ex
.rel. Sprenger v. Department of Health,23 where the court held
that the refusal of a license to a private hospital on the sole
ground that it would lower property values in the area of its
18. People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health, 189 N.Y. 187, 194, 82 N.E.
187, 189 (1907).
19. See People ex rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing Comm., 190
N.Y. 31, 82 N.E. 723 (1907).
20. See Small v. Moss, 277 N.Y. 501, 507, 14 N.E. 2d 808, 810 (1938) ; Schwab
v. McElligott, 282 N.Y. 182, 186, 26 N.E. 2d 10, 12 (1940).
21. People ex rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing Comm., smpra
note 19.
22. Picone v. Commissioner, 241 N. Y. 157, 149 N. E. 336 (1925).
23. 226 N. Y. 209, 123 N.E. 379 (1919).
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location was an abuse of discretion and subject to correction by
mandamus. In Ormsby v. Bell,24 however, the court refused to
issue a mandamus to the license commissioner of New York City
when he denied a license to a theatre which had been newly erected
next to a dry cleaning establishment. There was no limitation on
the issuance of theatre licenses to justify the refusal, but a city
ordinance forbade the licensing of a dry cleaning establishment
located next to a theatre. The Ormsby case stands as an exception
to the general rule in the cases involving unauthorized regulation,
and is an indication that the courts may take equitable considera-
tions into account where there are competing property interests.
In a later case the court once again invoked the general rule and
held that the refusal of a license to a theatre on the ground that
it would cause a traffic hazard in the area was improper.2
False Information
It is often said that there is an abuse of discretion by an
official when his action is based on false information. One court
has said that such action is "arbitrary" in the legal sense though
done in the best of faith.26 Actions based merely on conclusions
have also been held to be arbitrary. 7 Such statements appear to
be merely individual expressions of the general rule that judicial
review of administrative findings of fact (where such review is
allowable) may be had in mandamus proceedings. 28
Statutory and Constitutional Violations
Another instance wherein the courts find an abuse of discre-
tion is when the refusal of an official to act violates the law. This
is not necessarily a case where there is a "duty specifically en-joined by statute." In New York State Soo. of Prof. Eng. v.
Education Dep't,29 the court recognized that the Education De-
partment's power to change the name of an institution was dis-
cretionary but held that the refusal in this case to order the
removal of the word "engineering" from the name in question,
when a statute forbade such use,80 was subject to correction by.
mandamus. The court said: ". . . any act of any board which
24. 218 N.Y. 212, 112 N.E. 747 (1916).
25. Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E. 2d 281 (1938).
26. People ex rel. Hultman v. Gilchrist, 114 Misc. 651, 188 N. Y. Supp. 61 (Sup.
Ct.) aff'd 197 App. Div. 940, 118 N.Y. Supp. 944 (1st Dep't 1921).
27. Fedder v. McCaffrey, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Park Slope Chcv-
rolet v. Moss, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
28. See BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 9 p. 353 et seq.; Monument Garage v. Levy,
266 N.Y. 339, 194 N.E. 848 (1935).
29. 262 App. Div. 602, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 305 (3d Dep't 1941) ; cf. People ex tel.
Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 77 N.E. 785 (1906).
30. EDUCATIoN LAw § 1461.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
violates the law and which the board refuses to change when their
attention is called to it, without giving any reason, is arbitrary,
unfair and capricious." 3 1
Just as mandamus is proper to force action to correct an
illegal condition, it is improper where an action would create an
illegal condition. In Dr. Bloom Dentist Inc. v. Cruise,3 2 the court
held that the city clerk could not be compelled to issue a permit
for a sign when use of the sign by the applicant would violate
Regent's regulation on professional conduct. Refusal of a permit
for the use of an X-ray machine was held improper, however, when
it was based merely on a suspicion that the applicant would engage
in illegal activity.83
It would seem to be an obvious corollary to the cases on
statutory violations that if discretionary administrative action
or inaction is unconstitutional, 4 or based on an unconstitutional
statute, 5 that mandamus may be used to force proper action.
SPECIAL GROUNDS FOB REFUSAL OF MAnD .us
Even in cases where mandamus would otherwise be appro-
priate, the presence of some overriding factor may cause a denial
of this remedy to the petitioner. Where a statute does not au-
thorize an officer to act in a particular case there can be no com-
pulsion by mandamus.3 6 If the court feels that there is a more
appropriate remedy it will deny mandamus. In Walsh v. La Guar-
dia 7 the court refused to order the mayor and police commis-
sioner of the City of New York to stop the operation of unfran-
chised bus lines in that city, maintaining that an injunction and
not mandamus was the proper remedy. It further stated that:
"The interference of the Supreme Court in the details of municipal
administration is not to be encouraged." 38
It has already been noted that mandamus will not be granted
where it would cause a statutory violation. In Colonial Beacon
Oil Co. v. Finn,9 a building permit had been denied for a reason
not authorized by the legislature. The administrator, however,
31. 262 App. Div. 602, 604, 31 N.Y. S. 2d 305, 308; see Walsh v. LaGuardia, 269
N.Y. 437, 199 N.E. 652 (1936).
32. 259 N. Y. 358, 182 N.E. 16 (1921).
33. Sausser v. Dep't of Health, 242 N.Y. 66, 150 N.E. 603 (1926).
34. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 195, 33 N.E. 827 (1893).
35. Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E. 2d 632 (1950);
Davison v. Flannigan, 273 App. Div. 870, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 849 (2d Dep't 1948).
36. Wong v. Finkelstein, 299 N.Y. 205, 86 N.E. 2d 563 (1949).
37. 269 N.Y. 437, 199 N.E. 652 (1936).
38. Id. at 442, 199 N.E. at 654.
39. 245 App. Div. 459, 283 N.Y. Supp. 384 (3d Dep't 1935), aff'd 270 N.Y. 591,
1 N.E. 2d 345 (1936).
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had overlooked the fact that a granting of the permit might cause
a violation of a zoning ordinance. The court reversed a mandamus
order granted in the lower court, and held that where the action
of the official was justified, even though the reason for that action
was erroneous, mandamus would not be allowed since it is available
only to enforce a legal right.
It has also been said that a court will be reluctant to issue
mandamus where it will embarrass an important administrative
function.40 In the Luboil case the petitioner claimed to be the low
bidder for a public contract and sought to force the acceptance
of his bid. Justice Shientag stated: ". . . rarely will the court,
by way of an order in the nature of mandamus, direct an admin-
istrative agency to award a contract to a particular bidder." 41
Where a mandamus order would be futile the court will not
issue it. 42 In Matter of Lindgren,43 the court refused to compel
the board of elections to place the names of certain nominees on
the ballot when the board had refused to do so on the ground
that the nominees were in prison. After concluding that the
nominees could not hold office if elected the court said: "It does
seem reasonable to suppose that the election machinery . . . is
for the purpose of doing a useful and not a useless thing.) 44
I mITATION OF DISCRETION BY ADmINISTRATIVE PRECEDENT
An important question which frequently arises in cases of
mandamus is whether an administrator is bound by his previous
rulings handed down on a certain set of facts so that subsequent
decisions on similar facts must conform to those previously ren-
dered. In Larkin v. Schwab," the statute involved was an ordi-
nance passed by the Common Council of the City of Buffalo
providing that no consent for the installation of a tank for the
storage of gasoline in excess of five hundred and fifty gallons
inside of the city could be granted without the consent of four-
fifths of the council members. Although consent had been given
for the installation of tanks in locations similar to the one pro-
posed by the petitioner, the court held that the refusal of the
council to grant a permit in this case was not an abuse of discre-
tion. Judge Lehman said for a unanimous court:
40. Luboil Heat and Power v. Pleydell, 178 Misc. 562, 34 N.Y. S. 2d 587 (Sup.
Ct. 1942).
41. Id. at 566, 34 N.Y. S. 2d at 592. Contra, Arensmeyer-Warnock-Zarndt v.
Wray, 118 Misc. 619, 194 N.Y. Supp. 398 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
42. Schulster v. Carney, 276 App. Div. 592, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 703 (1st Dep't 1950).
43. 232 N. Y. 59, 133 N.E. 353 (1921).
44. Id. at 65, 133 N.E. at 355.
45. 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926).
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The mere fact that consents were granted to owners of prem-
ises somewhat similarly situated does not in itself show that
consent was arbitrarily refused to this applicant. The ques-
tion is not whether someone else has been favored. The ques-
tion is whether the petitioner has been illegally oppressed.
Exercise of discretion in favor of one confers no right upon
another to demand the same decision. Unlimited discretion
vested in an administrative board by ordinance is not narrowed
through its exercise. Calculated failure to lay down general
standards in the ordinance should not be nullified by inter-
pretation that each case passed upon creates a standard that
must be generally followed thereafter.4 6
Judge Lehman stated in a subsequent opinion that the rule of the
Larkin case applied in cases where power was conferred on a
legislative body, (and where the grant of power may, therefore,
be plenary) and not in the case of a purely administrative body.47
He did not indicate, however, whether he considered the paragraph
quoted above as part of the rule so limited.
In Marburg v. Cole,8 without mentioning the Larkin case,
Judge Finch, speaking for the majority of the court, attempted
through the greater portion of his opinion to justify the refusal
by the Commissioner of Education of an endorsement of a foreign
medical license on the ground that the preceding administrative
rulings on such endorsements established a standard for subse-
quent cases. Chief Judge Lehman joined in Judge Desmond's
dissenting opinion which denied that any standard could be derived
from the preceding cases other than the standard established by
the plain meaning of the statute.
The quoted language of the Larkin case was cited by the
Court of Appeals in Fiore v. O'Connell,49 however, in upholding
a ruling of the State Liquor Authority denying a license to the
petitioner after having granted one to another applicant who had
qualifications almost the same as those of the petitioner. In 1952
the Third Department upheld the right of the Regents to change
their mind by holding that permission to take the optometrist's
examination need not have been granted to the petitioner merely
because it had previously been granted to others with similar
qualifications.8 0
The rule quoted from the Larkin case would seem, therefore,
to still govern this area, whether the body is a purely admin-
46. Id. at 336, 151 N.E. at 639.
47. Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E. 2d 281 (1938).
48. 286 N. Y. 202, 151 N. E. 637 (1941).
49. 297 N. Y. 260, 78 N.E. 2d 602 (1948).
50. Marks v. Regetits, 279 App. Div. 476, 111 N.Y. S. 2d 362 (3d Dep't 1952).
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istrative one or a legislative body acting as administrator. The
rule, when originally applied and when cited in later cases, has
been applied only when it was the petitioner who was seeking to
assert the binding force of administrative precedent. When the
administrator cites his previous rulings, as in the Marburg case,
the courts will apparently give weight to the precedents as a factor
which may justify the administrator's action.
CONCLUSION
The adaptation of a common law remedy such as mandamus
to a developing field such as administrative law is attended with
the obvious danger that ancient theory will be allowed to frustrate
modern necessities. The persistence with which the courts return
to the use of the old phrases, after having abandoned the substance
of the rules which these phrases express, is somewhat of a
hindrance to present day practice. An authoritative recognition
of modern realities in the field of the review of administrative
activities would indeed be welcome.
Gerard Ronald Haas
